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Young Adults: A Distinctive Group
Under The Sixth Amendment's Fair
Cross-Section Requirement
By the time the English colonists' arrived in America, the right
of criminal defendants to have a jury determine their guilt or
innocence had become inherent and invaluable. 2 Not surprisingly,
the right to trial by jury was recognized in the Constitution 3 first
in article III, section 2,1 and later in the fifth 5 and sixth6 amend-
1. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *349 (Cooley ed. 1899).
Our law has therefore wisely placed this strong and two-fold barrier, of a
presentment and a trial by jury, between the liberties of the people and the
prerogative of the crown .... [T]he founders of the English law have, with
excellent forecast, contrived that ... the truth of every accusation, whether
preferred in the shape of indictment, information, or appeal, should afterwards
be confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbors
indifferently chosen and superior to all suspicion.
Id. at 349-50.
2. See R. Perry, SoUr~cES OF OUR LiBERTrEs 270 (1959). Perhaps because the right to
trial by jury was inherent and invaluable to the English colonists, the denial of the right
ranks among the grievances enumerated in the Declaration of Independence, where the
colonists complained that the King had deprived them of the benefits of trial by jury. See
The Declaration of Independence para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
3. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968). In Duncan, the Court explained
that the Framers of the Constitution realized that providing an accused with the right to be
tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt and
overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. If the defendant
preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury ... he was to have it. Id.
4. Article III, section 2, clause 3 of the United States Constitution states that "the
Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment; shall be by Jury. .. ."
5. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "No person shall
be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury ...... U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
6. The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial
jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.... ." Id. amend. VI.
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ments in the Bill of Rights. In Duncan v. Louisiana7 the United
States Supreme Court interpreted the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment to require that states8 provide trial by jury
in all serious offenses. 9
The United States Supreme Court has further protected and
enhanced the right to trial by jury by interpreting the Constitution
to require that juries in criminal cases, state or federal, be drawn
from venires'0 which represent a fair cross-section of the commu-
nity. 1 In part, the fair cross-section requirement means that dis-
tinctive groups may not be systematically excluded 2 from venires
without a valid governmental interest. 3 But, since the Supreme
Court has yet to define the phrase distinctive group, 4 state and
federal courts are without a uniform standard by which to determine
the cognizability of allegedly distinctive groups under the sixth
amendment. 15
This comment will discuss the sixth amendment right of criminal
defendants to have their guilt or innocence determined by a jury
drawn from a source which represents a fair cross-section of the
community.16 The sixth amendment requirement that distinctive
groups not be excluded from venires will then be discussed, 7 fol-
lowed by an examination of the factors courts use in determining
group distinctiveness. 8 Specific consideration will be given to the
current state of both California and federal law concerning judicial
recognition of young adults as a distinctive group. 19 Finally, this
comment will suggest that the purposes underlying the fair cross-
7. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
8. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156-157. Although the Court in Duncan realized that trial
by jury has its weaknesses, it extended the right to trial by jury to the states through the
fourteenth amendment, stating that juries "do understand the evidence and come to sound
conclusions in most of the cases presented to them and that when juries differ with the
result at which the judge would have arrived, it is usually because they are serving some of
the very purposes they were created and for which they are now employed." Id.
9. See id. A serious offense has been found to be any offense for which imprisonment
for more than six months could be imposed. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
10. A venire is the "list of jurors summoned to serve as jurors for a particular term."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1395 (5th ed. 1979).
11. See Glasser v. United States 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Taylor v. Louisiana 419 U.S.
522, 538 (1975).
12. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979).
13. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
14. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
15. See infra text and accompanying notes 93-94.
16. See infra text and accompanying notes 21-50.
17. See infra text and accompanying notes 51-85.
18. See infra text and accompanying notes 86-101.
19. See infra text and accompanying notes 102-37.
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section requirement call for judicial recognition of young adults as
a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes. 20
I. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY
A. The Fair Cross-Section Requirement
The United States Supreme Court has held that one of the primary
rights secured by the sixth amendment is the right of criminal
defendants to be tried before juries drawn from a fair cross-section
of the community. 2' This does not mean that criminal defendants
have a right to a petit22 or grand jury2 3 which represents a fair
cross-section of the community. 24 Nor may a criminal defendant
argue under the sixth amendment that the use of either for-cause 25
or peremptory26 challenges violates the fair cross-section require-
ment. 27 The fair cross-section requirement applies only to the source
from which petit or grand juries are selected.
28
20. See infra text and accompanying notes 138-85.
21. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Taylor is the first case to hold that
the fair cross-section requirement is fundamental to the sixth amendment. Before this holding
in Taylor, the Court had only implied that juries be drawn from sources truly representative
of the community. See e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946)
(stating that "the American tradition of trial by jury ... necessarily contemplates an
impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community.")
22. A petit jury is defined as "the ordinary jury for the trial of a civil or criminal
action; so called to distinguish it from the grand jury." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th
ed. 1979).
23. A grand jury is defined as a "body of citizens, the number of whom varies from
state to state, whose duties consist in determining whether probable cause exists that a crime
has been committed and whether an indictment (true bill) should be returned against one
for such a crime. If the grand jury determines that probable cause does not exist, it returns
a no bill. It is an accusatory body and its function does not include a determination of
guilt." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 768 (5th ed. 1979).
24. See Taylor, at 538. In holding that petit juries must be drawn from sources which
represent a fair cross-section of the community, the Court emphasized that "[d]efendants
are not entitled to a jury of any particular composition; but the jury wheels, pools of
names, panels, or venires from which juries are drawn must not systematically exclude
distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably representative thereof."
Id.
25. A for-cause challenge is defined as "a request from a party to a judge that a certain
prospective juror not be allowed to be a member of the jury because of specified causes or
reasons." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979).
26. "A request from a party that a judge not allow a certain prospective juror to be a
member of the jury. No reason or 'cause' need be stated for this type of challenge. The
number of peremptory challenges afforded each party is normally set by statute or court
rule." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (5th ed. 1979).
27. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986). The Court in Lockhart explained
1521
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Nearly all constitutional rules governing jury selection are now
codified in state and federal statutes .29 The federal statutes imple-
ment the constitutional policy that the guilt or innocence of a
criminal defendant should be determined by juries selected from a
fair cross-section of the community. 0 Under the federal statutes,
the chief judge of each district must present a plan3' to implement
jury selection.3 2 The plan must establish a jury commission or
authorize a court clerk to oversee the jury selection process. 33 The
plan must require that the jury commissioner or clerk work under
the supervision of the chief judge of the district or the designate
judge.34 The plan must specify whether prospective jurors will be
selected from voter registration lists or from lists of actual voters
from within the district. 35 The plan must also set forth additional
sources of names to be used in jury selection in case voter registra-
tion lists or actual voter lists fail to provide a fair cross-section.36
The plan must specify detailed procedures for selecting names of
potential jurors.3 7 Further, the plan must ensure that the jury wheel38
that "we have never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate the use of either for-
cause or peremptory challenges. Id. at 173. But cf. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
(holding, on equal protection grounds, invalid the use of peremptory challenges to remove im-
properly members of the defendant's race from jury participation).
In California, a prosecutor who improperly uses peremptory challenges to exclude members
of any distinctive group from jury participation violates the fair cross-section requirement
under Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.
3d 258, 280-82, 583 P.2d 748, 764-65, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 905-06 (1978) (holding that a
defendant has shown improper use of peremptory challenges once he shows either that the
prosecutor has struck almost all members of a distinctive group from venire or used a
disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against a distinctive group).
28. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174. The Court in Lockhart specifically stated: "The
point at which an accused is entitled to a fair cross-section of the community is when the
names are put in the box from which panels are drawn." Id.
29. See e.g., Federal Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869
(1982). For legislative history, see H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted
in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADhMN. NEws 1792. For a general summary of issues relating
to jury selection see Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 801, 811 app. (1979) (detailed analysis of
jury selection decisions).
30. See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982).
31. Id. § 1863(a).
32. Id. § 1863.
33. Id. § 1863(b)(1).
34. Id. § 1863(b)(1).
35. Id. § 1863(b)(2).
36. Id. § 1863(b)(1).
37. Id. § 1863(b)(3).
38. A jury wheel is defined as a "physical device or electronic system for the storage
and random selection of the names or identifying numbers of prospective jurors. A machine
containing the names of persons qualified to serve as grand and petit jurors, from which,
in an order determined by the hazard of its revolutions, are drawn a sufficient number of
such names to make up the panels for a given term of court." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY
769 (5th ed. 1979).
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substantially and proportionally represents the judicial district. 39
Once the plan is in effect, names from the jury wheel are selected
and assigned to jury panels from which qualified jurors are drawn
for duty.
40
Although procedures for compiling master jury lists vary from
state to state, almost all states follow guidelines and procedures
similar to those found in the federal statutes. 41 Some states, however,
use a "keyman ' 42 system to select names for master jury lists. 43
Under the keyman system, "key" local officials" recommend people
they believe to be qualified as potential jurors.45 The keyman system
also permits various county officials46 to recommend people of good
moral character to be used as prospective jurors. 47 The local officials
responsible for jury selection place these recommendations on ven-
ires from which jurors are drawn for duty.4
Two problems arise with the keyman system: First, individuals
recommending names of potential jurors may not know people who
belong to potentially large distinctive groups in the community;
second, the system is susceptible of intentional discrimination be-
39. 28 U.S.C. § 1863(b)(1) (1982).
40. Id. § 1863(b)(3).
41. See e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 204.5 (West 1982). In California the jury
commissioner follows rules of the court in compiling and maintaining master jury lists. Id.
But under this section, the jury commissioner must detail in writing the plan he uses, and
the plan must ensure that the names placed on the master jury lists from source lists are
randomly selected from a fair cross-section of the community. Id. Under the California Code
of Civil Procedure, master jury source lists are compiled from lists of names of registered
voters, licensed drivers, and identification card holders. Id. § 204.7.
42. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 234 § 4 (West 1986) (also called "selectman" or
"juror suggest" system).
43. The federal courts used the "keyman" system before enactment of the Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968. See H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53,
reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 1792 n.1.
44. E.g., court clerks and jury commissioners. See e.g., United States v. Duke, 263 F.
Supp. 828, 830 (1967) (the court provides a good discussion explaining the keyman system).
45. Massachusetts requires the following:
The board of election commissioners in cities having such boards, the board of
registrars of voters in other cities and the board of selectmen in towns shall
annually before July first prepare a list of such inhabitants of the city or town,
qualified as provided in section one, of good moral character, of sound judgment
and free from all legal exceptions, not exempt from jury service under section one
or two, as they think qualified to serve as jurors. The board shall place on said
list only the names of persons determined to be qualified as aforesaid upon the
knowledge of one of its members, or after personal appearance and examination
under oath, or after examination in the form of a questionnaire, approved by the
state secretary, to be answered under oath.
Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 234 § 4 (West 1986).
46. E.g., postmasters, school superintendents, assessors. Duke, 263 F. Supp. at 830.
47. Duke, 263 F. Supp. at 830.
48. Id.
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cause it allows individual choice in recommending names.4 9 There-
fore, the keyman system is more likely than the federal system to
produce venires which reflect a selected segment of the community
rather than a fair cross-section. Nevertheless, the United States
Supreme Court has held that the keyman system is constitutional
as long as the master jury source lists represent a fair cross-section
of the community.
50
B. Violating the Fair Cross-Section Requirement by Excluding
Distinctive Groups
Venires do not represent a fair cross-section of the community if
"distinctive groups" are excluded. 51 Therefore, court officials must
not exclude from venires people belonging to any judicially distinc-
tive group merely because of their group affiliation. 2 Generally
speaking, this requires c6urt officials to compile names for venires
without excluding any economic, sexual, religious, racial, political
or geographical groups.53 One of the primary reasons for not
excluding distinctive groups is that a jury whose composition lacks
a significant segment of society is inherently less effective in deter-
mining the guilt or innocence of a criminal defendant1 4
49. See H.R. Rep. No. 1076, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 53, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADmiN. NEWS 1792 n.1.
50. See Carter v. Jury Comm., 396 U.S. 320, 335 (1970) (holding that a jury selection
statute is not facially invalid because jury commissioners and clerks have wide discretion in
compiling source lists as long as the statute was capable of being carried out without
discrimination).
51. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946).
52. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975).
53. See Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220. This rule has been codified in Federal and State statutes.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1862 (1982) ("No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit
juror in the district courts of the United States or in the court of International Trade on
account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status."); See also CAL.
CIv. CODE § 197.1 (West 1982) ("No person shall be excluded from jury service in the State
of California on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status").
54. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). The Court in Peters offered the following
reasoning for not excluding distinctive groups:
The exclusion from jury service of a substantial and identifiable class of citizens
has a potential impact that is too subtle and too persuasive to admit of confinement
to particular issues or particular cases .... [new paragraph] When any large and
identifiable segment of the community is excluded from jury service, the effect is
to remove from the jury room qualities of human nature and varieties of human
experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. It is not
necessary to assume that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class in
order to conclude, as we do, that its exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective
on human events that may have unsuspected importance in any case that may be
1524
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1. A Sixth Amendment Fair Cross-section Distinctive Group
Challenge Under Duren v. Missouri
Two constitutional challenges are available to criminal defendants
who believe they were convicted by a jury whose source lists
excluded distinctive groups.5 5 The first challenge is based on the
sixth amendment and is best illustrated by the facts of Duren v.
Missouri.5 6 In Duren, the defendant argued that the source from
which his jury was selected did not represent a fair cross-section of
women in the community. 7 The United States Supreme Court held
that the defendant could establish a prima facie sixth amendment
claim if he proved the following: (1) that a group was excluded
from venire; (2) that this excluded group was a distinctive group in
the community; (3) that the representation of this group on venire
was not fair and reasonable compared with the number of group
members living in the community; and (4) that this unfair and
unreasonable representation was due to the systematic exclusion of
group members.5 1 If the defendant could make this prima facie
showing, the burden would then shift to the state to show that
presented.
Id. at 503-504 (emphasis added). See People v. Mora, 190 Cal. App. 3d 208, 221-222, 235
Cal. Rptr. 340, 349 (1987) (citing the foregoing passage from Peters in support of its argument
that young adults form a distinctive group).
55. Although the primary focus of this comment is on exclusion of distinctive groups
from venire under the sixth amendment, a brief look at exclusion under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment is necessary to distinguish the two types of venire
challenges.
56. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
57. Duren, 439 U.S. at 363. Under then existing Missouri law all women could receive
an automatic exemption from jury service upon request. See Mo. CoNsT. art. 1, § 22(b);
Mo. REv. STAT. § 494.031 (Supp. 1988).
58. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364. By comparison, California apparently adds an additional
"group substitution" requirement: "[T]he party seeking to prove a violation of the repre-
sentative cross-section rule must also show that no other members of the community are
capable of adequately representing the perspective of the group assertedly excluded."
(emphasis added) Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 98, 593 P.2d 595, 598, 154 Cal.
Rptr. 734, 737 (1979). (Bird C. J., Newman J., and Tobriner J. dissenting). The dissent in
Rubio argued that the majority cites no authority for its group substitution rule and that
once the court determines a group is distinctive, it need not determine any further distinc-
tiveness of the group. Id. at 107, 593 P.2d at 604-05, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 743. But this group
substitution rule is of questionable continuing validity. In People v. Motton, 39 Cal. 3d.
596, 704 P.2d 176, 217 Cal. Rptr. 416 (1985), the California Supreme Court determined
group distinctiveness without applying the group substitution theory of Rubio. Id. at 606,
704 P.2d at 182, 217 Cal. Rptr. at 422 (citing Tobriner's dissent in Rubio as "insightful").
1525
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excluding the distinctive group promoted at least one significant
and legitimate state interest.5 9
The Supreme Court applied these prima facie elements to the
facts in Duren and held that the defendant had established a
violation of the fair cross-section requirement. 60 Presenting evidence
that women comprised only 15016 of the venire in a community
where women comprised 54% of the population, the defendant
argued that a distinctive group in the community had been excluded
from venire-women. 61 He further argued that the underrepresen-
tation of women on venire was due to their systematic exclusion.
62
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that women formed a distinctive
group for sixth amendment purposes since they are distinct 63 from
men.64 Furthermore, the Duren Court held that a venire comprised
of 15% women was not fair and reasonable when compared with
a community whose population was comprised of 54070 women. 6
Since this large discrepancy occurred every week for over one year,
not just occasionally, the defendant had proved systematic exclu-
sion. 66 Finally, the state failed to carry its burden to show that
excluding women from jury service promoted a legitimate govern-
mental interest.67
2. A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Distinctive
Group Challenge Under Castaneda v. Partida
In addition to a sixth amendment distinctive group challenge, a
criminal defendant can challenge the constitutional validity of venire
on equal protection grounds. 68 In Castaneda v. Partida,69 the de-
59. Duren, 439 U.S. at 367-68. In Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Court
explained that these interests included a reasonable exemption based on special hardship,
incapacity or certain occupations whose uninterrupted performance is critical to the welfare
of the community. Id. at 534.
60. Duren, 439 U.S. at 366.
61. Id. at 364-66.
62. Id.
63. Calling women "distinct from men," the Supreme Court essentially took judicial
notice of women as a distinctive group. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
64. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
65. Id. at 364-66.
66. Id. at 366.
67. Id. at 369. The state argued that it had a legitimate interest in safeguarding the
role women play as homemakers. Id. See Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 534-535 (1975)
(the court in Taylor had already rejected the state interest in safeguarding the role women
play in home and family life).
68. See e.g., Hernandez v. Texas 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
69. 430 U.S. 482 (1977).
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fendant argued that the grand jury which indicted him was selected
from a venire which excluded persons with Mexican-American sur-
names.70 The United States Supreme Court held that a valid con-
stitutional challenge existed under the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, provided the defendant could show that (1)
the venire reflected a substantial underrepresentation of an identi-
fiable group or race; (2) that the defendant was a member of that
group or race; (3) that the underrepresentation 7' of the alleged
group had taken place over a significant period of time; (4) that
the venire selection procedure was susceptible of abuse or was not
racially neutral; and (5) that the statistical data supported the
presumption of discrimination.72 If the defendant could make this
showing, the prosecution would then have the burden of rebutting
the inference of intentional discrimination. 73
In Castaneda, the Supreme Court had no trouble concluding that
the defendant had established a prima facie case of discrimination
against Mexican-Americans. 74 The defendant, a Mexican-Ameri-
can 75 showed that over an eleven-year period only 39% of the
persons solicited for jury service were Mexican-Americans, an ethnic
group comprising 79% of the population. 76 This eleven-year time
span established the necessary discriminatory intent since the sub-
stantial underrepresentation of Mexican-Americans on venire oc-
70. 430 U.S. at 486.
71. This "rule of exclusion" allows a criminal defendant to prove underrepresentation
by comparing the number of group members in the total community to the number of group
members called to serve as grand jurors. Id. at 494.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 495.
74. Id. at 496.
75. In Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954), the Supreme Court held that Mexican-
Americans were a distinctive group. Id. at 480.
76. The Court relied on the following data to determine discriminatory intent:
Year No. Persons on grand Av. No. Spanish sur- Percentage Spanishjury list named per list surnamed
1962 16 6 37.5%
1963 16 5.75 35.9%
1964 16 4.75 29.7%
1965 16.2 5 30.9%
1966 20 7.5 37.5%
1967 20.25 7.25 35.8%
1968 20 6.6 33%
1969 20 10 50%
1970 20 8 40%
1971 20 9.4 47%
1972 20 10.5 52.5%
Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 487 n.7.
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curred over a significant period of time. 77 The Court also held that
the keyman system used to select the defendant's grand jury was
susceptible of abuse since it was a highly subjective system 8 Finally,
the prosecution was unable to rebut the strong inference of inten-
tional discrimination by establishing any legitimate reason for ex-
cluding Mexican-Americans .79
Although challenges to venire under both the fair cross-section
requirement and equal protection clause appear similar, important
and subtle distinctions exist between the two. Primarily, an equal
protection challenge requires the criminal defendant to be a member
of the allegedly excluded group. 80 But a criminal defendant chal-
lenging venire on sixth amendment grounds need not be a member
of the allegedly excluded group; the defendant need demonstrate
only that venire from which the jury was selected did not represent
a fair cross-section of the community. 8' An equal protection chal-
lenge requires purposeful discrimination.82 In contrast, a sixth
amendment challenge requires the defendant to present evidence
tending to show that exclusion was systematic rather than purpose-
ful.83 Finally, the burden that shifts to the prosecution for each
challenge is different: whereas the prosecution in an equal protection
challenge must prove no intent to discriminate, 84 the prosecutor in
a sixth amendment challenge must prove that excluding the distinc-
tive group serves at least one significant and legitimate state inter-
est.85
II. DEFINING GROUP DISTINCTIVENESS
77. Id. at 494. The Court explained that if the disparity between the number of group
members in the community and on venire is sufficiently large, the Court presumes the
disparity to be due to discriminatory intent. Id.
78. Id. at 498.
79. Id. at 497.
80. See id. at 494. ("[I]n order to show that an equal protection violation has occurred
in the context of grand jury selection the defendant must show that the procedure employed
resulted in a substantial underrepresentation of his race or of the identifiable group to which
he belongs.").
81. See Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). In Duren, a white male successfully
argued that the venire from which his jury was selected violated the sixth amendment cross-
section requirement since it did not reflect a fair cross-section of women in the community.
Id. at 364. This same defendant could not have challenged the venire on equal protection
grounds since he was not female.
82. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 494.
83. Duren, 439 U.S. at 364.
84. See Castaneda, 430 U.S. 482 at 495.
85. Duren, 439 U.S. at 368.
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A. Searching for a Definition of Sixth Amendment Group
Distinctiveness
The distinctive group requirement which began in Hernandez v.
Texas 6 as an equal protection requirement is also a requisite re-
quirement for sixth amendment venire challenges today.8 7 Although
the United States Supreme Court in Hernandez determined that
Mexican-Americans formed a distinctive group for equal protection
purposes, the Court carefully expressed its belief that race was not
the only basis on which the Court would decide group distinctiveness
issues.88 Accordingly, the Supreme Court has held that women, 9
daily wage earners, 90 persons of similar religious or conscientious
beliefs,9' and blacks92 form distinctive groups whose members cannot
be excluded from venire simply because of their group affiliation.
However, in no case where the United States Supreme Court has
faced the distinctive group issue has it defined the phrase distinctive
group.93 Rather, the Court has taken judicial notice of distinctive
86. 347 U.S. 475 (1954).
87. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (1979); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986);
Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 539 (1975).
88. Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478 (1954). In Hernandez the Court suggested the possibility
of future distinctive groups:
Throughout our history differences in race and color have defined easily definable
groups which have at times required the aid of courts in securing equal treatment
under the law. But community prejudices are not static, and from time to time
other differences from the community norm may define other groups which need
the same protection.
Id.
89. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 370; Taylor, 439 U.S. at 531 (both cases holding that
women form a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes).
90. See Thiel v. Southern Pac. R.R. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 222 (1946).
91. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). Some courts refer to these
kinds of group members as "Witherspoon-excludables." Witherspoon-excludables appear to
form a distinctive group for sixth amendment impartiality purposes in the special context
of the punishment phase of a capital case in a bifurcated trial. Id. In this context, members
of this group may not be excluded from jury service simply because their religious or
personal morals will not allow them to impose the death penalty. Id. But cf. Lockhart v.
McCree 476 U.S. 162, 183 (1986) (holding that Witherspoon-excludables do not form a
distinctive group for the guilt phase of a bifurcated trial).
92. See Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972). The Court held that Blacks form a distinctive
group on due process grounds. Id. 505. The Court also believed that blacks formed a
distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes, but could not hold squarely on the issue
because of the procedural posture of the case. Id. at 500 n.10; See also Swain v. Alabama
380 U.S. 202 (1965) (holding that Blacks form a distinctive group under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment).
93. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
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groups without much analysis or explanation. 94 Therefore, lower
courts have created their own approach to determine group distinc-
tiveness, using a "similar attitudes and ideas" standard.
95
The similar attitudes and ideas standard requires the court to
search the excluded group for an attribute or characteristic common
to all its members. 96 Courts typically look for any common behavior,
attitude, belief or prejudice97 which clearly distinguishes the chal-
lenged group from other segments of society.9 For example, the
California Supreme Court has held that a "common thread" must
run through the challenged group before the group can be distinctive
for sixth amendment purposes. 99 The common thread approach
requires a court to find some kind of attitude, idea, or experience
common to all members of the group. 100 The substance of this
94. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); See also Duren v. Missouri 439 U.S. 357
(1979) (holding that women are a distinctive group since they are sufficiently distinct from
men).
95. E.g., United States v. Guzman 337 F. Supp 140 (S.D.N.Y.), affirmed, 468 F.2d
1245 (1972).
96. See, e.g., Rubio 24 Cal. 3d 93, at 97, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737,
Adams, 12 Cal. 3d at 60, 524 P.2d at 378, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 250; Guzman, 337 F. Supp.
at 143.
97. See People v. Hoiland, 22 Cal. App. 3d 530, 539, 99 Cal. Rptr. 523, 529 (1972).
In Holland, the court expressed its task as looking for an "identifiable consistency in
behavior, attitudes, beliefs or even prejudices." Id.
98. See Guzman, 337 F. Supp. at 143.
99. The California Supreme Court first articulated the "common thread" standard in
Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 59, 59-60, 524 P.2d 375, 377-78, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247,
249-250 (1974) (holding that a one-year residency requirement as a prerequisite to being
placed on venire was not violative of due process or the equal protection guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment). The court in Adams relied exclusively on the fair cross-section
principle under the sixth amendment to determine the defendant's due process right to
proper venire compilation. Id. at 59, 524 P.2d 375, 378, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 (1974).
In Rubio v. Superior Court, the California Supreme Court applied the "common thread"
test to determine group distinctiveness. See Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 99, 101-
103, 593 P.2d 595, 597-98, 154 Cal. Rptr. 734, 736-37. The Rubio Court held that the
defendant had a constitutional right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and under Article I, Section 16 of the California Constitution to be tried by a
jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community, but failed to specify
whether it had applied the Adams "common thread" standard to the fair cross-section right
under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Article I, Section 16 of
the California Constitution. Id. 24 Cal. 3d at 97, 593 P.2d at 597-98, 154 Cal. Rptr. at
736-37. Therefore, under the principle set forth in Michigan v. Long, the Rubio court
applied the "common thread" standard for determining group distinctiveness under the
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032
(holding that when a "state court decision fairly appears to rest primarily on federal law,
or to be interwoven with the federal law, and When the adequacy and independence of any
possible state law ground is not clear from the face of the opinion, we will accept as the
most reasonable explanation that the state court decided the case the way it did because it
believed that federal law required it to do so.").
100. Rubio 24 Cal. 3d at 97, 593 P.2d at 598, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 737, Adams, 12 Cal.
3d at 60, 524 P.2d at 378, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
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common thread approach is the test almost all courts use to deter-
mine group distinctiveness, although the form courts use varies
widely. 10l
B. Youth as a Distinctive Group
Federal and state courts differ regarding whether young adults
form a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes, and the
United States Supreme Court has yet to squarely address the issue.10 2
The majority view of lower courts regarding young adults as a
distinctive group appears to have been expressed first in California
in People v. Hoiland.0 3 In Hoiland, the defendant presented statis-
tical evidence tending to show that the overwhelming majority of
residents in the community were students at the University of
California at Santa Barbara.1es The defendant used this evidence to
argue that the county judges responsible for venire compilation had
systematically excluded young people ages 21-30 from the grand
jury pool.'05 Rejecting this argument, the Hoiland Court reasoned
that no evidence clearly showed young adults (21-30 age group)
101. See, e.g., Rubio v. Superior Court, 24 Cal. 3d 93, 99, 593 P.2d 595, 599, 145 Cal.
Rptr. 734, 738 (1979) (ex-felons do not form a distinctive group); United States v. Brady,
579 F.2d 1121, 1131 (9th Cir. 1978) (the court in Brady took judicial notice of Indians as
forming a distinctive group); Adams v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 55, 60, 524 P.2d 375,
378, 115 Cal. Rptr. 247, 250 (1974) (residents of one year or less do not form a distinctive
group).
102, Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet decided this issue, the Court
has made reference to young adults as a distinctive group. See Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 137-38 (1974) (the Court assumed that young adults formed a distinctive group
to determine that young people were not systematically and purposefully excluded from
venire); in Batson v. Kentucky, the Court disallowed the use of peremptory challenges to
remove potential jurors on the basis of race. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)
(Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J., dissenting). The dissent wrote that group affiliation based
on age has traditionally been accepted as a legitimate basis for the states to exercise
peremptory challenges. Id. at 138. In White v. Georgia, the Supreme Court was presented
with whether to hear the issue of young adult cognizability (whether young adults within
an 18-30 age bracket formed a distinctive group), but a majority of the court denied
certiorari. See White v. Georgia, 414 U.S. 886, 886 (1973) (Brennan, J., Douglas, J., and
Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent contended that a substantial federal question was
presented where a large and identifiable segment of the community was arbitrarily eliminated
from the jury venire. Id. at 889-90.
103. See People v. Holand. 22 Cal. App. 3d 530, 99 Cal. Rptr. 523 (Ist Dist. 1971).
The result in Hoiland has been consistently followed in other first district cases. See People
v. Marbley, 181 Cal. App. 3d 45, 225 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1986); People v. Parras, 159 Cal.
App. 3d 875, 205 Cal. Rptr. 766 (1984); People v. Estrada, 93 Cal. App. 3d 76, 155 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (1979).
104. Hoiland, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 537, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
105. Id. at 537, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 528.
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were a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes. 0 6 Specifi-
cally, the court believed the very idea that young adults shared any
identifiably consistent behavior, attitudes, ideas, beliefs, or preju-
dices strained credulity 0 7 If anything, the court stated, young adults
share a common condition-the burden of getting an education,
fulfilling military service, or establishing a family."°3 But the court
did not believe that the condition of youth made young adults a
distinctive group.'0
Federal courts have also followed the result in Hoiland so that
all circuits that have decided the issue now hold that young adults
do not form a distinctive group.110 The most recent federal case to
address this issue, and one illustrative of the reasoning behind not
recognizing young adults as a distinctive group, is Barber v. Ponte."'
Directly overruling First Circuit precedent," 2 the majority in Barber
held that young adults did not form a distinctive group for fair
cross-section purposes."3 The defendant in Barber submitted a re-
port which proved that the percentage of young adults actually
appearing on venire was significantly lower than a random selection
from the community would have yielded." 4 But the court refused
106. Id. at 540, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 529. The court held that there was no clear evidence
that the defendant's mathematical segment of the population (21-30 age group) was a legally
distinctive class which required constitutional recognition. Id.
107. Id. at 539, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 529. The court stated: "To single out one group solely
on the basis of a nine-year age bracket as having identifiable consistency in behavior,
attitudes, beliefs or even prejudices ... is either to indulge in sheer presumption or to claim
unique omniscience." Id. But see People v. Mora 190 Cal. App. 3d 20S, 219, 235 Cal.
Rptr. 340, 346 (1987) (admitting the risk of "indulging in presumption" or "claiming
omniscience," the Mora Court nevertheless argued that a distinctive group could be delin-
eated on the basis of age alone).
108. Hoiland, 22 Cal. App. 3d at 540, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
109. Id. at 539-40, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 529.
110. Barber v. Ponte, 772 F.2d 982 (Ist Cir. 1985); Cox v. Montgomery, 718 F.2d 1036
(11th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Greer, 675 F.2d 141 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 975
(1982); Brown v. Harris, 666 F.2d 782 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 948 (1982);
United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577
(10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 905 (1973); United States v. Allen, 445 F.2d 849 (5th Cir. 1971); United'States v. Di
Tommaso, 405 F.2d 385 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied 394 U.S. 934 (1969).
111. 772 F.2d 982 (1st Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J., dissenting).
112. See La Roche v. Perrin, 718 F.2d 500 (1st Cir. 1983); United States v. Butera, 420
F.2d 564 (1st Cir. 1970).
113. Barber, 772 F.2d at 996. This case has an interesting procedural history. Upon first
appeal from the trial court, three appellate judges (Torruella, J., dissenting) held that young
adults did in fact form a distinctive group, but remanded for other reasons. Id. On petition
for rehearing en banc from remand, five judges reversed (Bownes, J., dissenting), holding
that young adults (age 18-34) did not form a distinctive group. Id.
114. Id. at 989. In a period between January 1, 1978 and October 31, 1980, the general
community population from which venire was made consisted of 37.82% young adults (ages
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to place significant importance on the statistical data of the defen-
dant, conjecturing that young adults could be absent for reasons
other than systematic exclusion.1 15 Instead of focusing on statistical
data, the court insisted that the main emphasis in any group
distinctiveness issue should be on class cognizability- 16 Since the
defendant in Barber offered no specific evidence that identified any
common characteristic shared by all people between the ages of 18-
35, the defendant had not shown young adults to be a distinctive
group.1 17 Furthermore, the court did not see anything distinctive
about the age bracket 18-35, since this age bracket could constitute
one, two, or more groups of young adults. 118
The dissent in Barber reasoned that young adults between the
ages of 18-35 did comprise a distinctive group which could not be
systematically excluded from jury pools."" Unlike the majority
which applied a slippery standard of similar attitudes and ideas, the
dissent focused on whether the alleged group was easily identifiable
and significant, 20 realizing that group distinctiveness resists specific
definition and that groups tend to overlap.' 2' The dissent argued
that because venire selectors had specific information regarding the
age of each potential venire member, venire selectors had the
opportunity to exclude persons on the basis of age alone. 22 In
addition, the actual number of young adults selected for the jury
pool was less than half the young adults a random selection would
have yielded. 1' Therefore, the opportunity to exclude on the basis
18-34), but only 18.16% of the jury venire consisted of persons between the ages of I8-34.
Id. at. 1000 n.l. The plaintiff further argued that if adults over the age of 70 were excluded
because they could exempt themselves under state law, young adults actually comprised
41.460 of the eligible jurors, but were placed on for the venire only 16.68% of the time.
Id.
115. Id. at 1000. The majority contended that "younger people may be away at school,
serving in the armed forces, surfing in Hawaii, etc." Id.
116. Id. at 999. The court called this emphasis "attitudinal representativeness." Id.
117. Id. at 998-99.
118. Id. at 998. The court explained that there could have been one group of young
adults encompassing ages 18-28, another 28-35 or different age groups within the 18-35 age
bracket encompassing other age groups. Id.
119. 772 F.2d 982, 1001 (Ist Cir. 1985) (Bownes, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 1001-1007. (citing Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503-504 (1972)) (by focussing
on the identity and significance of the challenged group, the dissent appeared to rely on the
standard set forth in Peters). See supra note 54 and accompanying text (for the standard
set forth in Peters).
121. Id. at 1001.
122. Id. at 1001.
123. Id. at 1000. Based on statistical evidence provided by defendant, the dissent noted
that "the probability of this discrepancy occurring by chance is less than one in one hundred
quadrillion." Id.
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of age, together with the probability of discrimination, resulted in
the systematic exclusion of a distinctive group-young adults. 24 The
dissent expressly rejected the majority's argument that measuring
group distinctiveness based on age alone would be too amorphous
an approach.1 25 In support of the argument that age could serve as
an appropriate basis for distinctive group cognizability, the dissent
pointed to the insurance industry, military service, and eligibility
for political office as areas where distinctive groups are not peculiar
to society, and where distinctive groups are delineated on the basis
of age only. 12
6
Some courts share the view of the dissent in Barber and reject
the reasoning and result of Hoiland.12 7 The most enlightening of
these cases is People v. Mora.25 In concluding that young adults
do form a distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes, the
Mora court expressly rejected the similar attitudes and ideas ap-
proach. 129 The court stressed that this approach is of little utility,
especially when applied to women 30 and blacks-people belonging
124. Id. at 1001. The dissent found that 37.82% of the population was large and that
the group was easily identifiable since all that was needed were birth dates. Id.
125. Id. at 1002. The dissent challenged the majority's "too amorphous standard" as
an illogical premise from which to proceed, asking when "does a Mexican-American or
Puerto Rican become simply a Texas [sic] or New Yorker and cease to be part of a distinctive
group?" Id.
126. Id. at 1001.
127. See. e.g., People v. Bartlett, 89 Misc. 2d 874, 393 N.Y.S.2d 866, 871 (1977) (holding
the jury array to be defective due to a gross underrepresentation of young adults between
the ages of 18 and 30); Julian v. State, 134 Ga. App. 592, 215 S.E.2d 496, 499 (1975)
(citing age as a factor to consider when ruling on the distinctive group requirement, although
the Court refused to hold that a three-year age group would define the group); People v.
Fujita, 43 Cal. App. 3d 454, 475, 117 Cal. Rptr. 757, 770 (1974) (citing age as a proper
criterion to identify a community group); People v. Superior Court, 38 Cal. App. 3d 966,
970-77, 113 Cal. Rptr. 732, 735-40 (1974) (concluding that discrimination on the basis of
age in the context of grand jury selection is improper); Paciona v. Marshall, 45 A.D.2d
462, 359 N.Y.S.2d 360, 361 (1974) (holding that intentional and systematic exclusion of
distinctive classes like women and students from grand jury service is improper); People v.
Marr, 67 Misc. 2d 113, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608, 615 (1971) (holding that young adults between
the ages of 21 and 32 constitute a distinctive group); State v. Holmstrom, 43 Wis. 2d 465,
168 N.W.2d 574, 578 (1969) (noting that systematic exclusion based on age renders the jury
array just as defective as any other type of systematic exclusion).
128. 190 Cal. App. 3d 209, 235 Cal. Rptr. 340 (1987). Although the Mora decision
regarding young adults as a distinctive group is technically dictum, the court devoted several
pages of its opinion to the subject, explaining, "[Tlhe issue is both controversial and
unresolved in our highest tribunals, and we are in disagreement with a number of state and
federal intermediate appellate courts." Id. at 218, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 346. The Mora decision
arises out of a peremptory challenge to jury compilation in the context of People v. Wheeler
22 Cal. 3d 258, 583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). See supra note 28 and accompanying
text (for the procedural posture of Wheeler).
129. Mora, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 346.
130. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). The United States Supreme Court
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to judicially recognized distinctive groups, but people who cannot
all possibly share common attitudes and ideas.' 3' In reaching the
conclusion that young adults do form a distinctive group, the court
did not focus on specific age brackets, but on young adults as a
whole generation. 3 2 It proposed that society can be broken down
into three separate and distinct categories: The young, the middle-
aged and the aged. 133 It also concluded that young adults share
common and distinct attitudes which differ greatly from the rest of
society. 34 Therefore, excluding young adults from jury participation
would weaken the strength of jury deliberation. 35 Finally, the court
in Mora argued that since almost all criminal defendants are young,
and since a jury ought to reflect one's peers, 3 6 excluding young
adults from jury service is fundamentally unfair.
137
has rejected the similar attitudes and ideas test as applied to women:
It is not enough to say that women when sitting as jurors neither act nor tend to
act as a class. Men likewise do not act as a class. But, if the shoe were on the
other foot, who would claim that a jury was truly representative of the community
if all men [young adults?] were intentionally and systematically excluded from the
panel?
Id. at 193-194.
131. Mora, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 219, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 346-347.
132. See id. at 220, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 347 ("there is no discounting the existence of a
certain commonality in the youth of this country despite its enormous numbers and diverse
composition").
133. Id. at 221, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 348 (the Mora Court cites Zeigler, Young Adults as
a Cognizable Group in Jury Selection, 76 Micn. L. REv. 1045 (1978)). This law review
article uses extensive empirical data to support the argument that young adults form a
distinctive group.
134. Id. at 221, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 348. In asserting its argument that young adults share
common attitudes, the Mora Court discusses the following:
It has become a social scientists' [sic] truism that the young share common and
distinct attitudes. The social scientists' evidence speaks to all the traditional criteria
of cognizability. That evidence supplements the ... argument that the young are
easily defined, and the presence of common attitudes suggests that the young are
cohesive ... Age crucially influences people's thoughts and acts: Age, in Man-
nheim's [sic] insightful formulation, locates individuals in the social structure.
There is much evidence that, for example, a person's activities, his attitudes toward
life, his relationships' to his family or to his work-as well as his biological
capacities and his physical fitness-are all conditioned by his position in the age
structure of the particular society in which he lives.
Id. (citing 3 M. RILEY, M. JoHNsoN & A. FONER, AGING AND SocmTY 398 (1972)).
135. See Mora, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 221, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 348. The Mora court noted:
"the evidence provides a basis for the inference that the attitudes of the young differ
sufficiently from those of the rest of the population that excluding the young from juries
would adversely affect the quality of deliberation." Id. Focussing on the strength of jury
deliberation is the same approach the United States Supreme Court used in Taylor when it
used sociological data which tended to show that "women bring to juries their own
perspectives and values that influence both jury deliberation and result." See Taylor, 419
U.S. at 532 n.12 (1975).
136. Mora, 190 Cal. App. 3d at 221, 235 Cal. Rptr. at 348.
137. Id. (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530).
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III. A PROPOSED SOLUTION TO DEFINING SIxTH AMENDMENT
YOUNG ADULT GROUP DISTNcTIvENEss
As discussed so far, nearly all courts that have decided whether
young adults comprise a distinctive group have focussed on whether
they share similar attitudes and ideas.' 38 Lower courts have taken
this approach since the United States Supreme Court has neither
defined the phrase distinctive group nor squarely decided whether
young adults form a distinctive group for sixth amendment pur-
poses. 139 Although the Court has not expressly defined the phrase
distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes, the Court has
recently resolved a sixth amendment group distinctiveness issue by
asking whether exclusion of the challenged group from venire con-
travened the primary purposes of the fair cross-section require-
ment.140 This approach, enunciated in Lockhart v. McCree,14' requires
courts to recognize young adults as a distinctive group for sixth
amendment purposes. 42
Lockhart involved an Arkansas felony murder case in which the
judge at voir dire' 43 removed for cause all potential jurors who
stated that they would not impose the death penalty under any
circumstance.44 After losing at the state level, the defendant sought
138. See supra text at notes 102-26.
139. See supra text at notes 93, 94.
140. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174-75 (1986).
141. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
142. See supra text at notes 154-85. The Lockhart approach obviously does not require
delving into the minds of young adults to determine whether they share similar attitudes
and ideas; rather, this approach applies the policy factors underlying the fair cross-section
requirement to young adults to determine whether they form a distinctive group which
should not be excluded from venires.
143. Because the defendant argued that excluding the challenged group at voir dire
violated his right to have a jury comprised of a fair cross-section of the community and
because the alleged right applies only to venire-not to jury composition-the Court did
not have to reach the issue of determining whether the challenged group was distinctive.
Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 173. See supra text at notes 24, 28. Nevertheless, the Court did so
under the assumption that the fair cross-section principle applied to petit juries. Id. at 174.
The Court stated:
We have never invoked the fair cross-section principle to . . . require petit juries,
as opposed to jury panels or venires, to reflect the composition of the community
at large .... [Aln extension of the fair-cross-section requirement to petit juries
would be unworkable and unsound, and -we decline McCree's invitation to adopt
such an extension."
Id. at 173-174.
144. Id. at 166.
1536
1988 / Young Adults
and received habeas corpus relief. 14- He contended that removing
these "Witherspoon-excludables"' 46 violated his sixth and fourteenth
amendment rights to have a jury drawn from a source fairly
representative of the community to determine his guilt or inno-
cence. 147 The district court agreed, 148 and the appellate court af-
firmed. 49 But the Supreme Court reversed' 50
In holding that Witherspoon-excludables did not form a distinctive
group for sixth amendment fair cross-section purposes, the United
States Supreme Court did not use a similar attitudes and ideas
test. 151 Instead, the Court determined group distinctiveness by first
outlining the three primary purposes of the fair cross-section re-
quirement expressed in Taylor v. Louisiana,52 and then resolving
whether excluding Witherspoon-excludables from venire promoted
or contravened these purposes.
5 3
The first purpose of requiring venires to reflect a fair cross-
section of the community is to protect against the use of arbitrary
government power and to ensure that the common sense judgment
of the community prevails against a mistaken prosecutor.: 4 If a
segment of society is excluded from jury participation for reasons
wholly unrelated to its ability to serve as jurors, the possibility
145. Id. at 167.
146. "Witherspoon-excludables" refers to potential jurors whose views (usually regarding
the imposition of the dedth penalty) "'prevent or substantially impair the performance of
his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath." See Wainwright v.
Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 433 (1985). See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
147. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 167. Understandably, the defendant argued that excluding
Witherspoon-excludables produced a conviction-prone jury. Id.
148. The trial court held that excluding Witherspoon-excludables before the guilt phase
of a bifurcated trial violated the fair cross-section requirement. See id. at 168.
149. See id. at 169.
150. Id. at 174-76.
151. See id. at 174-76. The Court did not employ the similar attitudes and ideas standard,
because, had the Court done so, it certainly would have found the challenged group to be
"distinctive," since all the excluded members shared a common belief concerning the
imposition of the death penalty and in fact were excluded for that reason. The Court's
approach in Lockhart therefore raises the issue of whether the Court impliedly has rejected
a similar attitudes and ideas standard to determine group distinctiveness for sixth amendment
purposes.
152. 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Citing Taylor, the Court in Lockhart identified these objectives:
(1) [G]uarding against the exercise of arbitrary power and insuring that the common
sense judgment of the community will act as a hedge against the overzealous or
mistaken prosecutor, (2) preserving public confidence in the fairness of the criminal
justice system, and (3) implementing our belief that sharing in the administration
of justice is a phase of civic responsibility.
See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75 (citing Taylor, 419 U.S. at 430).
153. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174-75.
154. Id. at 174. This first policy consideration in the context of jury trials and the sixth
amendment is not new to the court. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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exists that the jury composition in that district will be arbitrarily
skewed. .5 A criminal defendant tried before an arbitrarily skewed
jury is denied the benefit of the common sense judgment of the
community.1
56
Applying these policy considerations to the facts in Lockhart, the
Court held that the state of Arkansas had a legitimate interest in
excluding Witherspoon-excludables.' 51 7 The state sought to obtain
one jury properly and impartially qualified as a trier of fact at both
the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital case.' 58 Since exclusion
of Witherspoon-excludables was based on this legitimate government
purpose, the state had not arbitrarily skewed the jury composition." 9
Therefore, the defendant was not denied the benefit of the common
sense judgment of the community. 60
But excluding young adults from venire without a legitimate state
purpose can give rise to skewed jury composition thereby denying
criminal defendants the benefit of the common sense judgment of
the community.' 6' No legitimate governmental purpose exists for
the wholesale exclusion of young adults from venire.161 Further,
under the reasoning of Lockhart, exclusion of potential jurors on
the basis of age alone is improper since age is wholly unrelated to
a person's ability to serve as a juror. 6  Therefore, venires that
exclude potential jurors on the basis of age produce juries arbitrarily
skewed against criminal defendants. And a criminal defendant tried
before an arbitrarily skewed jury is denied the common sense
judgment of the community.
The second purpose of the fair cross-section requirement is to
preserve public confidence in the criminal justice system.t1 The
155. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. Id. The sixth amendment never has been interpreted to guarantee a criminal
defendant the right to have a jury determine the appropriate punishment, but only whether
a criminal defendant committed the charged offense. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984).
159. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 176.
160. Id. at 175.
161. See People v. Mora, 190 Cal. App. 3d 208, 221, 235 Cal. Rptr. 340, 348. In Mora,
the court argued that because nearly all criminal offenders are young, juries should fMirly
represent young adults in the community to give criminal defendants a jury of their peers,
Id.
162. This conclusion appears to accord with the policy declared in the Federal Jury
Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.SC. § 1861 (1982); See infra note 185 and
accompanying text.
163. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175.
164. See id. at 174-75.
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Court in Lockhart explained that excluding large groups from jury
participation creates an appearance of unfairness,165 especially when
exclusion is based on some immutable characteristic lying beyond
the control of a potential juror. 6 6 To illustrate this point, the Court
noted the immutability of blacks, women and Mexican-Americans
and explained that these traditionally excluded groups have no
control over their race, gender or ethnic background. 67 Therefore,
excluding members of these types of groups simply because of their
group affiliation is inherently unfair.6 8
On the facts of Lockhart, the Court held that excluding With-
erspoon-excludables from jury participation did not create an ap-
pearance of unfairness. 6 9 Unlike blacks, women, and Mexican-
Americans, Witherspoon-excludables are excluded from jury partic-
ipation because of a characteristic over which they have complete
control. 70 In the context of Lockhart, people belong to the group
Witherspoon-excludables because under no circumstance-even if
the law requires-will they impose the death penalty.17' Since With-
erspoon-excludables are excluded from jury participation because
of a characteristic which they themselves control, the Court held
that their exclusion created no appearance of unfairness. 72 There-
fore, their exclusion did not destroy public confidence in the crim-
inal justice system. ' 7
In contrast, the exclusion of young adults from jury participation
unquestionably creates an appearance of unfairness since exclusion
is based on a characteristic over which young adults have no
control-age. 74 In this sense, young adults are like traditionally
excluded classes: Young adults must belong to the group young
adults because membership in that group depends on age, an at-
tribute lying beyond the control of each individual member. Since
age is not within the control of any person, exclusion based on this
165. Id. at 175.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 176.
168. Id. at 175-176. Although the fair cross-section requirement exists to ensure fairness
to criminal defendants, the Lockhart approach to determine group distinctiveness seems to
focus, in part, on the fairness to the prospective juror.
169. Id. at 176.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 175-176.
173. Id. at 174-176.
174. Even though age changes it can never be within the control of any particular
individual.
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characteristic undermines the public confidence in the fairness of
the criminal justice system.
The third and final purpose of the fair cross-section requirement,
as explained in Lockhart, is to ensure that every individual help
shoulder the burden of administrating criminal justice by partici-
pating in the jury system175 Explaining this purpose further, the
Court in Lockhart noted that the improper exclusion of traditionally
distinctive groups has deprived citizens of their right to serve on
juries in criminal cases. 176 In Lockhart, however, the Court held
that excluding Witherspoon-excludables did not contravene the third
purpose of the fair cross-section requirement since removing With-
erspoon-excludables with cause from a capital case did not deny
members of that group the privilege to participate in other kinds
of criminal cases.'- Therefore, removing Witherspoon-excludables
led to no substantial deprivation of the basic rights of citizenship. 78
But excluding young adults from jury service substantially de-
prives them of a basic right of citizenship. 179 Master jury lists are
not normally compiled and used for any one case; they are compiled
and used for all criminal cases in a particular community.'t 0 There-
fore, when young adults are excluded from these lists, they are
denied a basic right of citizenship by being denied the opportunity
to participate as jurors in all criminal cases.' 8' One court has
recognized additional advantages of ensuring that young adults share
in the civic responsibility of administrating justice.8 2 In People v.
Marr, 1 3 the New York Court of Appeals explained that since many
young adults are alienated from the government, their participation
175. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175.
176. Id. at 175.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 175-176. Important to the Court's decision is the manner in which it
determined whether a substantial deprivation of the right to participate as jurors had taken
place. The Court did not focus on whether the challenged group was denied the opportunity
to participate in any one case, but focused on whether the challenged group was denied the
opportunity to participate in all criminal cases. Id.
179. The Supreme Court has underscored before the importance of sharing in the
administration of justice in the context of jury duty. See Thiel v. Southern Pacific R.R.
Co., 328 U.S. 217, 224 (1946) ("sharing in the administration of justice is a phase of civic
responsibility.")
180. United States v. Duke, 263 F. Supp. 828 (1967).
181. Being denied the right to participate in all criminal cases is precisely the problem
the Supreme Court in Lockhart thought to be egregious, calling it a "substantial deprivation"
of the right of citizenship. See Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 175-76. See supra note 178 and
accompanying text.
182. See People v. Mar, 67 Misc. 2d 113, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1971).
183. 67 Misc. 2d 113, 324 N.Y.S.2d 608 (1971).
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in jury service develops their sense of civic responsibility and creates
interest in and respect for the law.5 4 Therefore, in a much larger
sense, excluding young adults from participating as jurors not only
leads to a substantial deprivation of their right to citizenship, but
also denies them a socially important and socially valuable learning
experience. '8
CONCLUSION
This comment has illustrated that criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to be tried by juries drawn from a source which
represents a fair cross-section of the community. The sixth amend-
ment requires that distinctive groups not be systematically excluded
from venire absent a legitimate state interest. The similar attitudes
and ideas standard courts use at present to determine group dis-
tinctiveness is unworkable and unpredictable. Courts therefore need
to determine group distinctiveness by judging allegedly distinctive
groups by the purposes underlying the fair cross-section require-
ment.
The first purpose of requiring venires to reflect a fair cross-
section of the community is to prevent the use of arbitrary govern-
ment power and to ensure that the common sense judgment of the
community will prevail against a mistaken prosecutor. Second,
requiring venire to reflect a fair cross-section of the community
preserves public confidence in the criminal justice system. Third,
184. Id. at 615. The New York Court of Appeals stated the following reasons for holding
that young adults between the ages of 21 and 32 could constitute a distinctive group:
The court is aware of the alienation of many of our youth from the institutions
of government and feels strongly that participation in government, whether by
jury duty or voting or other means, will tend to decrease this sense of alienation.
Jury service is an important educational experience for the citizen. It encourages
the development of civic responsibility as well as an interest in, and respect for,
the law and its enforcement- For these reasons, as well as the primary one of
providing a fair trial, the officials who administer the jury system should take
whatever positive steps are necessary to insure that young adults are fairly repre-
sented on jury lists.
Id.
185. This conclusion accords with the policy declared in the Federal Jury Selection and
Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1982). The statute reads:
It is further the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the
,opportunity to be considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district
courts of the United States, and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when
summoned for that purpose.
Id. (emphasis added).
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requiring venire to reflect a fair cross-section of the community
ensures that every individual helps shoulder the burden of admin-
istrating criminal justice by participating in the jury system.
These purposes support the assertion that young adults form a
distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes.' 86 First, excluding
young adults from venires denies a great number of young criminal
defendants the benefit of judgment by their peers. Second, excluding
young adults on the basis of age-a condition over which an
individual can exert no control-is inherently unfair and erodes the
confidence society places in the criminal justice system. Third, and
perhaps most important, systematically excluding young adults from
venire substantially denies them a basic right of citizenship-the
opportunity to participate as jurors in the criminal justice system.
Bryan D. Smith
186. This comment has purposefully not attempted to specify any age brackets which
might encompass young adults. This kind of determination must be made on specific facts
as cases arise. Perhaps the words spoken by Justice Powell in Barker v. Wingo are worth
repeating here:
We find no constitutional basis for holding that the speedy trial right can be
quantified into a specified number of days or months ... our approach must be
less precise.
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 523 (1972). Rather than quantify young adults into
specified age brackets, this comment has instead suggested that young adults form a
distinctive group for sixth amendment purposes. How or when a constitutional right is
protected means nothing if not recognized at all.
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